The Eric Tetralogy: 2: The Tea Party

A subsaga of FTC the Fairy Tale of Capitalism

FTC’s important characters and concepts appear in the titles of episodes that describe them, and are Capitalized wherever they appear in FTC.

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Image: Cooper (1789, USA Public Domain)
In our last episode King Eric became King of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. With his ships and shore batteries, he would one day acquire and enforce a Monop controlling passage through the Oresund and the Denmark Straits. For large merchant ships, there was no feasible passage from the Baltic to the North Sea other than the Oresund. To obtain the safety and speed of passage that King Eric could make scarce, the master of a vessel had to pay Eric’s toll, the Sound Dues. King Eric would collect Monop Rents, reducing the benefit of the trade for the master and increasing the benefit of the trade for himself.

In other kinds of products than marine shipping, and the agricultural Land of Old One Ricardo’s Tales, a Monop escapes the constraints of competition and, within limits, controls the trade. To oversimplify slightly, the Monop names the price at the expense of the counterparty. The difference between the Monop’s price and a hypothetical competitive market price is the Monop Rent, the benefit of the trade the Monop shifts from the counterparty. Consider tea, for instance.

One night, the Sons of Liberty, a political group, dressed as American Indians and rowed into Boston Harbor. They sneaked aboard ships of the British East India Company (chartered by Queen Elizabeth I as the first limited-liability corporation). They tossed the cargo of tea into the water, an event remembered as the Boston Tea Party.

British East India Company Flag (William Downman, 1685)
Most inhabitants of the Massachusetts Colony lived in Boston, the third largest city in British America. Massachusetts had no representative in the British Parliament, which recently had enacted the Tea Act of 1773. By the Tea Act the East India Company paid an import tax on tea, and the Company got a Monopoly importing tea to the colonies. Ships and soldiers of the Crown prevented smuggling and competition.

Eric’s Sound Dues toll was intentionally small to avoid provoking significant opposition. Likewise the British Parliament intended the Tea Act duty would arouse little opposition.

Though the Tea Act tax was small, “No taxation without representation!” became a slogan of the Sons of Liberty. Sam Adams, one of their leaders, said the Monopoly, even without a tax, was tantamount to a tax. He recognized Monopoly as a burden the State enforced on the people who could buy only from the Monopoly. The Boston Tea Party was a foreshock of the American Revolution, but that’s another story.

Long after the Boston Tea Party, and some old timers said it was even later than the great wars and the death of Reagan, clouds darkened the windows of banks throughout the world. The banks had lent money to many people who now lacked income because their employers, the Ingenious Innovative Job Creators, had dismissed them from their jobs. The dismissed employees stopped paying the banks.

For a long while, the bankers were certain all would be for the best. The bankers had bought Puts. They had confidence, financial expertise, and many reasons why Puts reliably rise when other investments fall. “The risk actually undertaken is very modest and remote,” the bankers said. Despite the confidence, sellers emerged. In October, prices of shares on the Exchange hit a record peak, then meandered downward day after day for many months, a period remembered as the year of the confident bankers.

On a Thursday in February more than a year following the price peak, television journalist Rick Santelli, reporting on current trading from the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, expressed exasperation that governments were giving money to people who seemed undeserving, because they should have the wisdom and personal responsibility to provide for themselves. Mr. Santelli pronounced an unusually entertaining and memorable editorial, culminating with “We’re thinking of having a Chicago Tea Party in July”. In these few words, Mr. Santelli ignited a new political movement, called the Tea Party.

In the Fairy Tale of Capitalism, we often find one term with two meanings. In this case, Santelli’s Chicago Tea Party opposed taxes and the government giving money to people they thought didn’t deserve it. The Boston Tea Party opposed taxes and the government giving a Monop to a Firm, which was utterly different. Incidentally, each week, King Eric’s job included sending soldiers some place or other in his vast realm to suppress peasant uprisings and rebellious nobles. The chronicles are silent on rebel opposition to Eric’s taxes.

In the year of the confident bankers, the bankers explained that the declines in prices reflected mere paper accounting losses. In the second winter after the October peak, many mere paper losses became real money losses.  Some people, such as bankers and householders, urged government intervention to make good the debts the dismissed employees stopped paying, especially after some Puts failed. Then, less than a month after Santelli’s proclamation, prices’ long meander downward became a financial cascade. Prices on the New York Stock Exchange sank to their lowest level following the peak.

The Tea Party favored minimal taxation, because with less taxation, they would have more money to spend on cars and houses in foreclosure, as Mr. Santelli had explained. They favored property rights, Capitalism and minimal government. They disfavored ideas like government economic stimulus spending, universal public education, universal health care, public fire departments, government food for starving children, and other undeserved or unnecessary government expenses that taxation would ultimately fund.

Image: Nathaniel Currier (1846, Public Domain)
The next episode describes the Staffs (yes, plural) more, but for now, know that each Aristocratic household had their own Staff of people to care for its Firehose Up, the household’s income stream. The Staffs applauded the rise of the Tea Party. Property rights, Capitalism, minimal government and minimal taxation favored their work on the Firehose Up. If a Staffer did her job well, then she could describe increasing profits in her quarterly reports, which would please her Aristocrat employer, who would keep her on the payroll and increase the Staffer’s pay. But a disappointed Aristocrat could dismiss a Staffer from her job.

Property rights meant governments would protect the Aristocrats’ Capital, so no one else could divert it. Capitalism, of course, was that virtuous confluence of free markets and private property that the Old Ones Smith and Ricardo had described and the Old Ones Marx and Engels had named. The Firms owned by the Staffs’ employers, the Aristocrats, manifested the virtuous confluence.  

The Staffs valued minimal government. Big government would impose laws regulating how the Managers treated the Workers. Big government forced them to do something with production waste other than release it in the convenient river adjacent to the factory. Big government required they expose their accounts and explain their Firms in public disclosures.  Government regulatory meddling required truckloads of reports implying expenses of document preparation and handling. Regulation by big government helped sometimes, but mostly it caused significant expenses from unnecessary (because honorable Managers ran the Firms) work.

Profits were the revenues, minus the expenses, and minus the taxes. (Technically, any payment by the Firm reducing the profit of the Capital is an expense, including Rents paid to landlords, wages paid to Workers, and taxes paid to government.) Not only did big government regulation burden the Firms with expenses, the Staffs explained, big government also required unnecessary government expenses, financed by taxes.

Without the “job-killing” regulation and taxes of big government, said the Staffs, the Managers might raise the wages of the Workers, and the Ingenious Innovative Job Creators might hire more Workers. The Staffs omitted to mention they might not. And, of course, expenses reduced the current quarter’s profits the Staffs reported to their Aristocrats.

The Staffs and the Tea Party fell in love from the start. The Staffs provided dazzling verbosity and graphs to the Tea Party. The Staffs urged Professors to sing “Growth of GDP” and other songs about how lower taxes increased government tax revenues and about how magnifying the flow of incomes through the Firehose Up, the Aristocracy’s income stream, enabled the Ingenious Innovative Job Creators to hire more Workers. The Professors sang innumerable ballads on the Firehose Up conveying GDP growth to Aristocrats so the Downward Trickle would benefit the Workers.

The Staffs arranged their Aristocrats political contributions so the Tea Party could get control of government. They arranged the charitable contributions to business schools to provide incomes for esteemed Professors. The Professors and the Staffs, having been educated by the Professors, provided intellectual allure to the non-intellectual Tea Party. The Tea Party welcomed anyone who favored Capitalism, ideologists of the respectable William Buckley and Ayn Rand styles, Supercompensated CEOs, Aristocrats, the Staffs, and small-government Libertarians, because these people saw the unnecessary and undeserved expenses of big government. They also welcomed survivalists, gun enthusiasts, religious zealots, advocates of unscientific points of view, anti-intellectuals, lonely people adopting new friends’ views, self-styled “conservatives”, and others. Together their large influential minority voting block had power. Tea Party members came mostly from the 90 Percent. In the Tea Party, the Workers aligned with the Aristocracy, the Staffs and the Managers.  

Every Staffer knew her future income could depend on the next quarterly report.

The chronicles tell us that on coming to the age of majority, the handsome, strong, daring and impetuous King Eric of Denmark declared diplomacy had produced little, and something about “make Denmark great again”. He made war for territory, draining the treasury, weakening the military, and losing a little land rather than gaining it. War for land would lead to his great Monop by sea, the principal component of his Firehose Up, about which we will learn more in the next episode.

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My deep thanks goes to editor and friends who critiqued my prepublication drafts.


The Fairy Tale of Capitalism: Author's Note

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From the first episode of the Fairy Tale of Capitalism, readers sent me comments such as
“I understand GDP now!”, and
“Interesting and certainly topical”, and
“The capitalism that you are describing IS what happens”, and
“Another delight that kept me entranced.”
These were good words, because others liked my writing FTC.

Other comments included
“I understood neither the economic fundamentals described in the article nor its goals”, and
“It’s not clear that it’s sarcastic”, and
“Am I missing something?”, and
“This particular blog doesn’t seem to be a Fairy Tale at all”, and
“So what?”, and
“I understood this! Is there more to the story? What happens next?”
These were good words, because they signaled I might improve the story.

I know nothing with certainty. The reader should draw her own conclusions about the Fairy Tale of Capitalism. I see my vanity in my uncertainty and hesitation to state my conclusions. I don’t know what to do about it. Hence this note acknowledges my dear readers’ views, yet still offers no certainty.

I first used the term “Fairy Tale of Capitalism” in an email to my good friend Dr. Stetson. I wrote that Republicans seemed to rely on the Fairy Tale of Capitalism. (In fairness, not only Republicans, but also Democrats and the smaller parties indulge in numerous economic fantasies.) My articulation of FTC didn’t then exist, but the term "Fairy Tale Capitalism" had been used. The Republicans asked us to believe that Capitalism (or something called “Capitalism”, or “private enterprise”, or something along these lines), with its Invisible Hand and Downward Trickle and other characteristics, will produce improved lives for all, if only the U.S. Congress will reduce regulation and income taxes. I noted the Republicans sincerely believed this, apparently, as did Joe the Plumber, many of the Tea Party, and many of Mr. Trump’s supporters in his presidential campaign. I think this notion of Capitalism breaks up on rocks of measured empirical reality.

Empirically, historical tax cuts and deregulations hadn’t produced improved lives for all. In recent decades, in the United States, for the wealthiest ten percent of the people, incomes improved. For the next 40 percent, there was relatively little change. For the remaining 50 percent, incomes declined and one-eighth of households were “food-insecure” (that is, starving or nearly so) . For the wealthiest one percent, income growth and relative wealth were fabulous, spectacular and colossal. Where was the Invisible Hand distributing goods to the 50 percent? Where was the Downward Trickle’s distribution of prosperity? Instead, weren’t the Invisible Hand and the Downward Trickle in a class with Santa Claus and the Eight Flying Reindeer?

If my words are provocative, it is to challenge, not to insult. Competitive markets and private property are powerful tools. They can provide incentives and disincentives that encourage vigorous production and distribution of useful goods. Our society, collectively, devised them. Not to use them would be negligence, for the goods they provide are useful to many people. But they are merely tools. They aren’t innately virtuous. Both bad and good things have been accomplished with them. Some things they can't do. Let us seek wise usages.

One evening during a long bike ride, my brother Rock and Dr. Stetson and I stopped at the Third Base Tavern. While sampling a delicious unique house-made firewater, we conversationally arrived on the topic of Job Creators, a term widely (though incorrectly, in my opinion) used as a rough synonym for business owners or entrepreneurs. I said there was no such thing, that while business owners and entrepreneurs existed, they didn’t “create jobs”. My companions said on the contrary that, “obviously”, they did. I could only shake my head and inarticulately mutter “It’s just not so.” I felt I must find a better way to state my case. That moment was the call, and I answered the call. A few days later I returned home and wrote the first episode “The Fairy Tale of Capitalism: The 90 Percent”. Incidentally, that first episode isn’t about the Ingenious Innovative Job Creators, for that’s another story.

In the Fairy Tale of Capitalism, I want to describe some of the numerous regions of economics. The episodes of FTC should be understandable. Each should explain some arcane complexity. Sometimes I don’t achieve that, though I try. If the story begins to make no sense, just skip to the next paragraph. Much of FTC doesn’t matter much, for it is a dramatization and a comedy. Much of it presents central economic concepts. I flatter myself to think I write FTC with lucid infallibility, but as a child of the Enlightenment, I’m honored knowing read with skepticism. Ultimately, I want to explain how the Downward Trickle is merely a diminishing feeble trickle, how the Invisible Hand can punch you in the nose, and how the Ingenious Innovative Job Creators don’t create jobs. The episodes occur in random order, more or less. There is no conclusion but yours.

I hope you enjoy reading the Fairy Tale of Capitalism.

Petaluma, California, August 21, 2017

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I'm indebted to my friends who gave me the benefits of their comments on prepublication drafts, their corrections, their criticisms and advice, and their encouragements.

Images and Sources

Images may be freely used in reproduction of this article. They are my own or used in compliance with fair use doctrines of copyright law.

Alisha Coleman-Jensen, Matthew P. Rabbitt, Christian A. Gregory and Anita Singh, "Household Food Security in the United States in 2015" (Sep 2016, United States Department of Agriculture, https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/79761/err-215.pdf?v=42636)

Emily Eisenlohr, "Fairy Tale Capitalism: Fact and Fiction Behind Too Big To Fail" (2010, http://amzn.to/2x7cBqS)

Mihir Shah, "Fairy tale capitalism" (Apr 24, 2014, The Indian Express, http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/fairy-tale-capitalism/)


The Eric Tetralogy: 1: Rents and Monops

A subsaga of FTC the Fairy Tale of Capitalism

FTC provides a way to explain our circumstance.

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Eric of Pomerania 1381-1459 (Public Domain)
Long before the Old Ones, the sorcerer of strategy selected her great-nephew Eric of Pomerania to be King of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. His future held trials and adventures and triumphs, wars, the Monop shifting the benefits of trade to enhance the Firehose Up, the eventual grandeur of his kingdom, the woman he would marry, the woman he would love, his flight from the throne, and piracy. In his Wikipedia portrait, he looks as though his lunch distressed his belly, and he was known for his troublesome temper. But he could be more handsome and charming than any Hollywood hero. Pope Pius II wrote “all women were drawn to him.” 

What is the Firehose Up? What is a Monop? I’m glad you asked. Let’s start with what a Monop is, how it works, and where Monop Rents come from.

A Monop is a Monopoly or a Monopsony or a person who benefits from them. A marketplace having a single seller Monopoly has no competition among sellers. A Monopsony has no competition among buyers. 

King Eric established a long lasting Monop, so we know Monops existed. But the Tales of the Old Ones give little attention to Monops. In their minds, monops didn’t exist, except possibly as transient or trivial phenomena of no importance. There were many competing buyers and sellers who quickly undercut any advantage gained from a strong market presence. Monops couldn’t endure. 

In a trade, each of two parties gives up something they want less in exchange for something they want more. When a grocer gives up a tomato in exchange for money, the counterparty gives up money in exchange for a tomato. The buyer wants the tomato more than the money which he can’t eat, while the grocer prefers money because she has more tomatoes than she can eat, and she has many uses for money. Each party gets a benefit from the trade, the difference between the thing wanted more and the thing wanted less, a kind of profit for each party.

The manager of the only factory in a small town is the single buyer in a Monopsony. She gives up money in exchange for a Worker’s Labor. Generally, considering trades of all kinds, nothing distinguishes the buyer from the seller, except that the seller receives money. Monopoly and Monopsony have the same essential character. 

The Monop controls something scarce. The Monop can give up the scarce item in exchange. No one else can. Since the counterparty can’t get the item from anyone else, the Monop dictates the price. A Monop grocer can price the tomatoes so high that most customers choose cheap beans instead. A Monop employer can pay the employees just enough to meet immediate necessities if they get second jobs somewhere. In practice, some traders dominate their markets, participating in 60% or 80% of the transactions, with nearly the same influence they would have with 100% dominance. They have much of the same market character as Monops, and we call them Monops, too.    

Monops figure but tangentially in the Old Ones’ Tales, specifically in Ricardo’s parables of Rent. Here’s how it goes in FTC.

The farmer’s role is that of Ricardo’s Capitalist who brings investment, her own or that of her investors, and the Capitalist’s return is the profit. The farmer-Capitalist may hire Workers or perform some of the Labor role herself. For an insignificant ceremonial permit fee to the landlord, a shilling or so in Ricardo’s time, the landlord can claim the land as property, and with the fee receipt the farmer can claim permission to use the land. 

Good land becomes scarce when demand for product rises, and the best land can’t produce enough. Then farmers cultivate the second-best land. The second-best land produces less crop than the best land. Now competing landlords of the best land can collect Rent, in addition to the ceremonial fee, from competing farmers, but the second-best land gets zero Rent, just the ceremonial fee. (The farmer and landlord don’t know the future market price nor the quantity of harvest, so they agree to Rent as a fraction of crop at the time the plow hits the dirt.)

If the competing landlords ask too much Rent, then the competing farmer tenant moves cultivation from the best land to second-best land. If the profit from the second-best land equals the profit from the best land, then there’s no difference to the farmer between cultivating the best land and the second-best land. The landlord can collect Rent until the farmer comes to the point of no difference, but not more.

That is, the competing farmer will trade some portion of the crop as Rent to the landlord, until the Rent reduces the farmer’s profit from farming a unit of the best land almost to the level of the profit of farming a unit of the second-best land. In this case, the scarcity of the best land (and property rights) gives one party the ability to transfer some benefits of the trade to herself from the counterparty. The ability to shift the benefits of the trade is the key character of Rent.  

The marketplace demand for product creates Rent. If demand for product grows to exceed the capacities of the best land and the second-best land, then the competing farmers will cultivate the third-best land. Only then can competing landlords demand Rent on the second-best land based on the market value of product from the third-best land. Landlords do nothing to produce Rent other than collect the ceremonial fee that maintains their property rights to the Land. 

Ricardo’s parable of Rent ends here with competing landlords and farmers and no Monops. We elaborate on implications of Monops without the wisdom of the Old Ones. 

The competing landlord can’t get more Rent than the neighboring landlord for land of the same quality, for the competing farmer chooses the landlord with the lesser Rent. But a farmer with a Monop landlord has no choice. No competition from other landlords constrains the Monop landlord. The Monop can enlarge her benefit from the trade by shifting to herself some of the farmer’s benefit from the trade. 

Despite paying high Rent to the Monop landlord, the farmer must maintain her level of profit, her benefit from the trade, to continue in business, lest her investors take their Capital to other ventures. The farmer may try raising the price she asks for product in the marketplace. If buyers of product will pay sufficiently more, the farmer restores her profit by getting some of the benefit of trade from the buyers of product. The benefit of the marketplace trade shifts via the trades to the Monop landlord who collects the shifted benefit as Rent. And if the buyers of product won’t pay the higher price, then the Monop landlord can’t get more Rent, because the farmer can’t pay. Characteristic of Monop Rents, the maximum price the Monop can ask exceeds the maximum under competition. Another definition, succinct though pivoting on “dominance”, is Paul Krugman’s “monopoly rents: profits that don’t represent returns on investment, but instead reflect the value of market dominance.” 

Workers taught their children that competing buyers and sellers bring happiness for everyone. 

King Eric collected Monop Rents. Eric, with his shore batteries and ships, controlled passage of merchant vessels through the Oresund and the Denmark Straits. Eric increased the benefit of the trade to himself by reducing the benefit of the trade to the masters of the vessels. The next episode of FTC will be an author's note, after which we’ll follow with the story of the Tea Party and more about King Eric. Oh yes, and the Firehose Up.

I'm most grateful to my friends who gave me the benefits of their comments on prepublication drafts, their corrections, their advice and their encouragements. 

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Images for the Eric Tetralogy

W.D. Cooper, “Boston Tea Party”, published in “The History of North America” ( 1789, E. Newbury, London https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tea_Act#/media/File:Boston_Tea_Party-Cooper.jpg, Public Domain in USA, copyright may apply in Switzerland, Mexico, Germany, Mainland China and Canada)

Nathaniel Currier, “The Destruction of Tea at Boston Harbor” (1846, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Boston_Tea_Party_Currier_colored.jpg

“Elizabeth I of England” (circa 1590, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, England, Creative Commons Non-Commercial Share with Attribution, http://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/14154.html

“Eric VII of Denmark” (a.k.a. Eric of Pomerania, Southerly Clubs of Stockholm Sweden, Public Domain https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_of_Pomerania#/media/File:Eric_VII_the_Pomeranian_of_Denmark_(photo_2010)_crop.jpg)

William Downman, “Flag of the British East India Company” from “Notebook” (1685, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=4118976)

Hans Peter Hansen, "Coronation of Eric of Pomerania" (1884, Wikimedia, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AErik_af_Pommern.jpg)

Nicholas Hilliard, “Portrat eines Junglings unter Rosen, Robert Devereux 2nd Earl of Essex” (circa 1588, Collection of the Victoria and Albert Museum, Public Domain, Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nicholas_Hilliard_013.jpg

J. P. Morgan portrait, (Wikipedia, Public Domain, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._P._Morgan)

Oresund Map (Karte des Ă–resund / Quelle: Meyers Konversationslexikon von 1888, Band 10, Seite 61, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Karte_der_Umgebung_von_Kopenhagen.jpg)

“Theodore Newton Vail” (circa 1918, Library of Congress, Wikipedia, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Theodore_Newton_Vail_circa_1918_cropped.png)

Sources for the Eric Tetralogy


AT&T, “History of AT&T” (http://www.corp.att.com/history/)

CNNMoney, “The story of Ma Bell” (Jul 9, 2001, http://money.cnn.com/2001/07/09/deals/att_history/)

Dealbook, “Back to the Future for AT&T” (Mar 21, 2011, New York Times, https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/back-to-the-future-for-att)

Joseph D. Kearney, “From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act: Regulation of Telecommunications Under Judge Greene” (Jan 1, 1999, Marquette Law Scholarly Commons, Marquette University Law School, http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1503&context=facpub)

Jason Manning, “Ma Bell Breaks Up” (2000, The Eighties Club, http://eightiesclub.tripod.com/id310.htm)

New York Times, “AT&T’s History of Invention and Breakups” (Feb 13, 2016, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/12/technology/att-history.html?_r=0)

Eli M. Noam, “Viewpoints: 10 Years After Bell’s Breakup; The Split-Up Worked. No, It Didn’t” (Jan 23, 1994, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/01/23/business/viewpoints-10-years-after-bell-s-breakup-the-split-up-worked-no-it-didn-t.html)

Larry Press, “A short history of the telephone industry and regulation” (California State University, http://bpastudio.csudh.edu/fac/lpress/471/hout/telecomHistory/)

Jane Bryant Quinn, “Ma Bell’s Breakup Means Big Changes Ahead for Phone Users” (Jan 31, 1983, Washington Post,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1983/01/31/ma-bells-breakup-means-big-changes-ahead-for-phone-users/185c55de-505f-4f1b-98e8-e1e2bf3b67b2/?utm_term=.cfdfacfd0e32)

Tim Wu, “The Great American Information Emperors” (http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/features/2010/the_great_american_information_emperors/how_theodore_vail_built_the_att_monopoly.html)

Tim Wu, “The Master Switch” (Nov 2, 2010, Knopf, http://amzn.to/2gUXtsM)


Associated Press, “U.S. dropping its long, costly antitrust suit against IBM” (Jan 9, 1982, Chicago Tribune, http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1982/01/09/page/4/article/u-s-dropping-its-long-costly-antitrust-suit-against-ibm)

G. David Garson, “Public Information Technology and E-governance: Managing the Virtual State” (2006, Jones & Bartlett Learning, https://books.google.com/books?id=OwYnTHQC4e0C&pg=PA229&lpg=PA229&dq=eu+ibm+bundling+monopoly&source=bl&ots=9CCNvs6On9&sig=ATB3jWKv_nmVlxVlxgsYoSxpXaI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjn0v6vnqLVAhWhilQKHYoyBBoQ6AEITTAH#v=onepage&q=eu%20ibm%20bundling%20monopoly&f=false)

Hagley Museum and Library, “Richard Thomas deLamarter collection of IBM antitrust suit records: Historical Note” (http://findingaids.hagley.org/xtf/view?docId=ead/1980.xml

Bob Johnson, “U.S. Drops IBM Suit” (Jan 18, 1982, Computerworld, https://books.google.com/books?id=rx3ssrOcCTkC&pg=PA6&lpg=PA6&dq=justice+drops+ibm+case&source=bl&ots=VaR4pZF0p_&sig=_u3PpzkzZbu3trTa0O_sZuxb9zE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiW7_XZnaLVAhXqwlQKHRScCkwQ6AEIPDAF#v=onepage&q=justice%20drops%20ibm%20case&f=false)

David Levy and Steve Welzer, “System Error: How the IBM Antitrust Suit Raised Computer Prices” (1985, Cato Institute, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1985/9/v9n5-6.pdf)


James Kanter, “European Regulators Fine Microsoft” (Mar 6, 2013, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/technology/eu-fines-microsoft-over-browser.html)

John R. Wilke and David Bank, “Microsoft Is Found to be Predatory Monopolist” (Nov 8, 1999, Wall Street Journal https://subscribe.wsj.com/microexamples/articlefiles/MicrosoftIsFoundtoBePredatoryMonopolist.doc)

Standard Oil Company

The Learning Network, “May 15, 1911 | Supreme Court Orders Standard Oil to Be Broken Up” (May 15, 2012, New York Times, https://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/15/may-15-1911-supreme-court-orders-standard-oil-to-be-broken-up)

“Standard ogre” (Dec 23, 1999, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/node/347251)

Ida Tarbell, “The History of the Standard Oil Company” (1904, amazon.com/History-Standard-Oil-Company-Volumes/dp/1519455860https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=zaYZAAAAYAAJ&rdid=book-zaYZAAAAYAAJ&rdot=1)

Other sources

Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans and A. Jorge Padilla, “The antitrust dynamics of tying: a farewell to per se illegality” (2004, United States Department of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-economics-tying-farewell-se-illegality)

Magnus Bjornsson, “Ebay: A Concise Analysis” (2001, http://www.cs.brandeis.edu/~magnus/ief248a/eBay/)

Daniel Brockman, “The Fairy Tale of Capitalism: CEOs, Growth and Prosperity of Society” (Mar 31, 2017, https://daniel-brockman.blogspot.com/2017/03/ftc-ceos-growth-prosperity-society.html)

Daniel Brockman, “The Fairy Tale of Capitalism: Land and Ricardo” (Apr 27, 2017, https://daniel-brockman.blogspot.com/2017/04/FTC-Land-and-Ricardo.html)

Daniel Brockman, “The Fairy Tale of Capitalism: Managers, Professors and Engels” (Jun 12, 2017, https://daniel-brockman.blogspot.com/2017/06/ftc-managers-professors-engels.html

Daniel Brockman, “The Fairy Tale of Capitalism: The 90 Percent” (Nov 30, 2016, https://daniel-brockman.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-fairy-tale-of-capitalism-90-percent.html)

Daniel Brockman, “The Fairy Tale of Capitalism: Supercompensation, Income and The Exchange” (Apr 6, 2017, https://daniel-brockman.blogspot.com/2017/04/ftc-supercompensation-income-the-exchange.html)

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